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The Dark Web:
Some Thoughts for An Educated Debate
Vanessa Henri, LL.B, LL.M*
Abstract
The ‘‘dark web” is a part of cyberspace that is only accessible through an
anonymity software, such as The Onion Router. This encrypted network has
prompted important legal challenges. As jurisprudence develops, many factors are
at risk of inhibiting users’ right to privacy. Misunderstandings of the dark web’s
functioning or myths regarding its veil of anonymity has justified invasive criminal
investigations that has threatened users’ right to remain anonymous online. This
article discusses these challenges while analyzing current legal developments in the
United States and Canada.
Sector by sector the state is being cut out of the equation and power is
being returned to the individual. I don’t think anyone can comprehend
the magnitude of the revolution we are in. I think it will be looked back
on as an epoch in the evolution of mankind.1
— Ross Ulbright (Dead Pirate Roberts, administrator of Silk Road)

Over the last decade the ‘‘dark web” has emerged in the media as a site of
anarchy, where criminals can conduct their business in impunity. Headlines
about worldwide drug markets2 and online pedophilic communities3 have
prompted questions as to whether a wider range of power for law enforcement is
necessary in order to combat crime in the digital world.4
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D.C.L. Candidate, McGill University. The author wishes to thank the Quebec Bar
Foundation which funded the publication of this article and further researches on cyber
criminality, legislative intervention and the dark web.
Andy Greenberg, ‘‘An interview with a digital drug lord: The Silk Road’s Dread Pirate
Roberts (Q&A),” Forbes (14 August 2013), online: <www.forbes.com>.
See most recently ‘‘Why China’s plan to build a new Silk Road runs through Singapore,”
Bloomberg (14 August 2016), online: <www.bloomberg.com>; Max Plenke, ‘‘Drug
sales on the dark web have tripled since the demise of Silk Road,” Business Insider (12
August 2016), online: <www.businessinsider.com>; ‘‘Despite Silk Road’s demise,
more illicit drugs are being bought online,” Sputnik News (14 August 2016), online:
<www.sputniknews.com>; Curtis Silver, ‘‘Illicit online drug sales triple in absence of
Silk Road,” Forbes (11 August 2016), online: <www.forbes.com>.
See most recently Bob Brenzing, ‘‘Grand rapids man sentenced for trading child porn on
‘dark web’,” Fox17 West Michigan (21 July 2016), online: <www.fox17online.com>.
See David Kushner, ‘‘The Darknet: is the Government destroying the ‘Wild West of the
Internet’?,” Rolling Stone (22 October 2015), online: <www.rollingstone.com>; Steve
Ranger, ‘‘Hacking by police ‘inevitable’ thanks to use of encryption,” ZD Net (11 June
2015), online: <www.zdnet.com>.
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Nonetheless, the dark web hosts more than just criminals. The most popular
software to access this network, The Onion Router (Tor), has about 2.5 million
users daily5, including students, researchers, journalists, human rights workers
and members of the parliament or law enforcement who need to protect sensitive
information. Following Snowden’s revelations on the activities of the National
Security Agency, many felt their privacy was not protected on the internet.
Others use the dark web to avoid the surveillance of totalitarian governments
such as China’s communist party, which use the Great Firewall of China as the
main means of internet censorship.
In today’s high-tech world, the right to privacy is perceived as a safeguard
against the threat of a big-brother type of government — a threat which was
specifically recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Duarte.6 This
right, while not protected explicitly by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,7 is manifested in s. 8 of this document, which protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, privacy is crucial to freedom of
speech8 in the sense that anonymity encourages individuals to speak freely.
The literature has suggested that technological changes have impacted
human rights, particularly the right to privacy.9 Precisely, this is demonstrated by
the emergence of stricter standards regarding the handling of personal
information and the necessity of due diligence concerning protection of this
data.10 In criminal matters, especially in dark web cases, the right to privacy is at
risk of being engulfed by the perception that enlarging law enforcement’s reach is
beneficial and required.
This perception is fueled by law-officials’ misunderstandings relating to the
technological aspects of the dark web and of its apparent impenetrability.
Indeed, judges do not have the credentials nor the experience regarding the dark
web and its functionality thereby forcing them to blindly trust the expertise
provided by forensics and technology experts. While Canadian courts have yet to
be confronted with the issue of expectations of privacy in the dark web, 11
American courts, on the other hand, have developed a rich jurisprudence which
5

6
7
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9
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Larry Hardesty, ‘‘Shoring up Tor—Researchers mount successful attacks against
popular anonymity network—and show how to prevent them,” MIT News (26 July
2016), online .
R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30, 1990 CarswellOnt 77 sub nom. R v Sanelli.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Charter, ibid, s. 2.
See R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 343 at para 1 [Spencer].
See e.g., Manitoba which has recently enacted a private sector privacy statute (Personal
Information Protection and Identity Theft Prevention Act, SM 2013, c 17) and the federal
government which enacted Canada’s anti-spam legislation, see An Act to promote the
efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that
discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities, SC 2010, c
23.
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helps to raise some useful questioning as to how Canadian courts should handle
the matter.

I. MISUNDERSTANDINGS CHARACTERIZING LEGAL
PRECEDENTS
It is typical for western justice systems to enlist the services of qualified
experts in order to better understand a foreign subject, such as those pertaining
to science and forensics. The experts’ role is to provide the judge with the
necessary information allowing them to make a sound judgement based on
expertise, common practice and accepted beliefs. Realistically, judges and
lawyers cannot be expected to become computer engineers or experts in the dark
web within a few hours. In reality, the knowledge they will have access to
depends on the questions asked by the interrogating lawyer and on the
perspectives endorsed by the expert questioned. As a result, current jurisprudence
is characterized by misconceptions of different orders, and include those
pertaining to the functioning of the dark web (e.g. how it manages to protect
users’ anonymity) and to its impenetrability (e.g. the authorities’ capability (or
lack thereof) of conducting criminal investigations). This contributes to the
erosion of privacy in the dark web.

(a) Functioning
Cyberspace is commonly divided between three ‘‘layers”. The first is known
as ‘‘surface web”, and refers to the static websites that are typically accessible
through mainstream search engines. The second layer, the ‘‘deep web” or
‘‘invisible web” refers to content that cannot be indexed by search engines. These
include online databases such as CanLII or Jstor.12
The third layer, the ‘‘dark web”, is an alternative network in which search
engines’ crawlers are completely ineffective; hidden websites are listed in
directories (e.g. DeepDotWeb, PasteBin, AnonBin) or on dedicated Reddit’s
threads. The network can only be accessed through special software such as ‘‘The
Onion Router”, ‘‘I2P, ‘‘Freenet” and ‘‘Riffle”. 13
Each software uses different algorithms to guarantee users’ privacy. Tor, for
instance, is based on military grade encryption, asymmetric encryption and
layers of protection (‘‘the Onion technology”). When an information travels
through the Tor network, it is stripped of its header (the addressing information
about the sender). The header is then encrypted and referred to as ‘‘the packet

11

12

13

Though the recent decision Spencer, supra note 10, established a useful precedent on
privacy in cyberspace that is likely to influence future decisions implying the dark web.
Ryan Dube, ‘‘Journey Into The Hidden Web: A Guide For New Researchers,”
MakeUseOf (31 October 2014), online: <www.makeuseof.com>.
Jannal Kagel, ‘‘An Up-to-Date Layman’s Guide to Accessing the Deep Web,” FC
Technology (10 September 2015), online: <www.fastcompany.com>.
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wrapper”. The encrypted packet is routed through many relays (or servers), in a
private networking pathway:
The circuit is extended one hop at a time, and each relay along the way
knows only which relay gave it data and which relay it is giving data to.
No individual relay ever knows the complete path that a data packet
has taken. The client negotiates a separate set of encryption keys for
each hop along the circuit to ensure that each hop can’t trace these
connections as they pass through.14

In other words, each relay will decrypt and encrypt again the data packet
wrapper, hence hiding the message, but also its metadata.
Tor lets users navigate the web anonymously, but also allows the creation
and hosting of anonymous websites by hiding the location of the server.
Originally created for military and intelligence sharing purposes, Tor has gained
popularity with many groups, including criminal organizations, which profit
from the anonymity of the network to engage in illicit activities such as
prostitution, child pornography and others. Some of these criminals were caught
by the authorities using new investigative techniques on the dark web, which are
now under legal scrutiny.
In this context, judges have been confronted with the technical aspects of the
dark web, such as in the recent motion pertaining to the case of U.S. v Farrell,15
in which the defendant was seeking to obtain more information pertaining to the
methods used by law enforcements to discover his identity in the dark web.
Specifically, in this affair, US District Judge Richard A. Jones stated that:
In the instant case, it is the Court’s understanding that in order for a
prospective user to use the Tor network they must disclose information,
including their IP addresses, to unknown individuals running Tor
nodes, so that their communications can be directed toward their
destinations.16

While it is true that nodes are operated by volunteers across the world, these
individuals typically do not have access to users’ IP addresses. Judge Bryan’s
position, which was also endorsed in U.S. v Michaud,17 was vehemently criticized
by researcher and journalist Joshua Kopstein as factually incorrect:
This makes no sense to anyone with a basic understanding of how Tor
works. Just like with any website or service, Tor users do reveal their IP
address to an ISP when initially connecting to the Tor network,
through an entry point called a guard node. But since Tor bounces data
between random nodes located around the world, neither the ISP nor

14
15
16
17

The Tor Project, online: <www.torproject.org/about/overview>.
United States v Farrell, 2016 WL 705197 [Farrell].
Ibid.
United States v Michaud, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash Jan 28, 2016) [Michaud].
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anyone intercepting traffic can correlate which IPs are accessing which
sites.18

The various hearings in U.S. v Michaud also demonstrate that judges have
trouble seizing the authorities’ allegations in regards to the way they investigate
throughout the dark web.
The Michaud affair concerns the use of a Network Investigative Technique
(NIT) by law enforcements to de-anonymize the users of a child pornography site
titled ‘‘Playpen” located in the dark web. ‘‘Operation Pacifier” required the FBI
to take control of the website during 13 days in order to inject ‘‘[m]alicious
scripts into pages hosting images of child abuse, which downloaded the NIT to
the visitors’ computers and returned the machine information, including their
true IP addresses, to the FBI.”19 The operation led to more than 135 arrests,20
many of which are still in the early stages of legal proceedings.
Judge Bryan refused to dismiss the indictment against Michaud, stating that
the FBI’s use of mass hacking was not shocking. Nonetheless, the court’s
hearings shed a bright light on the obvious lack of knowledge on the judge’s part:
Judge Bryan: ‘‘Do the FBI experts have any way to look at the
NIT information other than going to the server?”
Colin Fieman (Michaud’s public defender): ‘‘Your Honor, they
don’t go to the server.”
JB: ‘‘Where do they go? How do they get the information?”
CF: ‘‘They get it from Mr. Michaud’s computer.”
JB: ‘‘They don’t have his computer.”21

It also appears that, at the time, Judge Bryan was not aware that the NIT is
in fact a form of hacking: ‘‘I suppose there is somebody sitting in a cubicle
somewhere with a keyboard doing this stuff. I don’t know that. It may be they
seed the clouds, and the clouds rain information. I don’t know.”22
In February 2016, Judge Bryan nonetheless approved the defendant’s third
request to access the source code of the NIT, though not without noting its own
technical incomprehension of the subject matter:
Now, you know, behind that ruling is this: The government hacked into
a whole lot of computers on the strength of a very questionable search

18

19
20

21

22

Joshua Kopstein, ‘‘Confused judge says you have no expectation of privacy when using
Tor,” Motherboard (1 February 2016), online: <www.motherboard.vice.com>.
Ibid.
See Gabrielle Banks, ‘‘Federal agents sweep child pornography site by hacking ‘dark
web’ site,” Houston Chronicle (10 April 2016), online: <www.houstonchronicle.com>;
Benjamin Vitaris, ‘‘More arrests in the playpen case,” DeepDotWeb (14 April 2016),
online: <www.deepdotweb.com>.
Joseph Cox, ‘‘Judge in FBI Hacking Case is Unclear on How FBI Hacking Works,”
Motherboard (27 January 2016), online: <www.motherboard.vice.com> [Cox].
Ibid.
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warrant. I ruled on the admissibility of that in what I considered to be a
very narrow ruling.
Much of the details of this information is lost on me, I am afraid, the
technical parts of it, but it comes down to a simple thing. You say you
caught me by the use of a computer hacking, so how do you do it? How
do you do it? A fair question.23

As journalist and expert Joseph Cox highlights that such confusion relating
to the dark web often occurs with relation to the authorities’ use of NIT, such as
with search warrants:
[A] problem in some NIT cases is that judges have trouble understanding, even in general terms, what hacking tool is, what they do, or
how they work. To be clear, this isn’t to place all blame on judges.
Instead, it’s arguably a problem stemming from how the Department of
Justice and the FBI have framed and referred to NITs in legal
documents, meaning that some judges may not fully realise the power
and scope of the searches that they authorise. [. . .] This confusion, in
part, arose from the language used in NIT warrants and supporting
documents. The word ‘‘hack,” is never used, and neither is ‘‘malware”
or ‘‘exploit,” for that matter. Instead, the procedure of malware being
downloaded to a target’s computer is largely obfuscated in vague
terminology.24

This situation is worrying given that judges and lawyers’ discomfort with
computer sciences encourage them to rely excessively on either sides’
observations and prevents them asking relevant questions. Precisely, as it was
the case in U.S. v Michaud and U.S. v Farrell, it reassures judges to endorse the
authorities’ investigative methods without much criticism, 25 and at the expense of
users’ right to privacy and anonymity in the dark web.

(b) Impenetrability
Another misconception relating to the dark web arises from the belief that its
veil of anonymity is impenetrable, hence justifying methods of investigation that
would otherwise be considered highly invasive or too broad for the purpose of a
warrant. This perception is inaccurate, as there remains much vulnerability
which can be exploited by law enforcement. They usually classify within two
23

24
25

Michaud, supra note 18, Defendant’s third motion to compel (17 February 2016), court
hearing at 18.
Cox, supra note 22.
See United States v Matish, 193 F.Supp.3d 585 (2016), in which the court finds that the
source code of the FBI’s NIT is not useful to the defense, while at the same noting that the
technicalities should be left to computer experts. This, of course, raises questions as to
how the court can affirm that the source code is not useful for the defense if it does not
have the expertise to understand it: ‘‘The Court FINDS ex parte and in camera inspection
of the exploit unnecessary. Such examination would not have assisted the Court in
dealing with the issues before it. The technicalities of such an examination are better left
to computer experts” [Matish].
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sometimes overlapping groups: (i) the vulnerabilities pertaining to human errors
and (ii) the vulnerabilities arising from the network itself.

(i) Human errors
A critical aspect of maintaining anonymity in the dark web depends on the
user. Tor, for instance, requires precautions and changes in habits from its
users.26 Precisely, it ‘‘only protects [. . .] applications that are properly configured
to send their Internet traffic through Tor,” hence why using another browser
than the Tor browser is ‘‘likely to be unsafe.”27 This means that users cannot
navigate the internet like they usually do, such as by watching videos on
YouTube. Torrent file-sharing applications are not safe either, given that they
‘‘ignore proxy settings and make direct connections even when they are told to
use Tor” and therefore ‘‘often send out [users’] real IP address.” 28 This is also
true of browser plugins like Flash, RealPlayer and QuickTime which can be
manipulated in revealing IP addresses.29
Users may also reveal their personal information when downloading
documents off the dark web and subsequently opening them, because ‘‘these
documents can contain Internet resources that will be downloaded outside of Tor
by the application that opens them.”30 In order to safely open downloaded
content, users must download Tor-friendly applications such as the PDF viewer
built into the Tor Browser.
Another source of vulnerability stems from human error. It includes
navigating websites that require a user to login. These include websites like
Reddit which are risky because it allows observers to ‘‘ti[e] many different
behaviors (browsing, posting, and commentating) together,” hence providing a
‘‘rich supply of information” to identify the user.31
There are also many other suggestions that may improve anonymity such as
placing duct tape on webcam, enabling computer’s firewall, and turning off
cookies and JavaScript.32 It is also noteworthy that, by default, TOR ‘‘does not
prevent somebody watching your Internet traffic from learning that you’re using
Tor”33. To avoid this, users must set Tor bridge relay — a process which requires

26

27
28
29
30
31

32

33

‘‘Q&A: The Deep Web, Anonymity, and Law Enforcement,” Trend Micro (10
September 2015), online: <www.trendmicro.com> (Interview with Martin Roesler,
Senior Director of the Trend Micro Forward-Looking Threat Research (FTR) team).
Tor Project, ‘‘Want Tor to really work?”, online: <www.torproject.org> [Tor Project].
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Andre Infante, ‘‘5 ways to stay safe from bad Tor exit nodes,” MakeUseOf (2 July 2015),
online: <www.makeuseof.com> [Infante].
Jennal Kagel, ‘‘An Up-To-Date Layman’s Guide to Accessing the Deep Web,” FC
Technology (10 September 2015), online: <www.fastcompany.com>.
Tor Project, supra note 28.
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some familiarity with computer sciences. All of these precautions make the use of
Tor challenging for regular users.
In addition to these, individuals using the dark web for criminal purposes are
susceptible of the same errors than regular criminals. Chelsea Manning, for
instance, notoriously shared how she used the dark web to leak information to
Wikileaks with another hacker who subsequently reported her to the authorities
and handed over the chat log of the conversation. In fact, traditional methods of
investigation such as infiltration and the use of informants remain totally
relevant for the authorities, as demonstrated in recent arrests and contrary to
what was stated in United States v Matish.34
In the Marco Polo operation, which was followed by numerous arrests in
relation to the drug dealing website Silk Road, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)35, was able to conduct an effective operation which started with
information given by a source. In order to map the operation, the authorities
focused on identifying the top one per cent sellers, the moderators and system
administrators as their computers or credentials ‘‘could open the door to the
site’s private communications and account details.”36
More specifically, an undercover agent who worked on building a
relationship with the system administrator, Dread Pirate Roberts, was able to
take over Curtis Clark Green’s account, accessing ‘‘the details of sales
transactions and information about the Bitcoin accounts of users and
administrators — including the account of Silk Road’s alleged owner, Ross
Ulbricht”37 (Dread Pirates Roberts).
Eventually, the authorities managed to arrest Ulbricht:
After authorities intercepted some fake ID’s that they say he ordered
online, investigators from HSI visited Ulbricht’s home in San
Francisco. Ulbricht, agents say, had by then made a number of
mistakes that allowed them to tie him to Silk Road, including using the
name ‘‘altoid” to post messages advertising Silk Road to a forum and
then using that same name to post to a Bitcoin forum seeking workers
for a Bitcoin startup. In the latter message, ‘‘altoid” told would-be job
applicants to contact him at rossulbricht@gmail.com. A subpoena to
Google provided information about the accountholder. Last July,
authorities identified an overseas hosting company used to host the Silk
Road site and obtained an image of the server, giving them access to all
the private messages on the site. [. . . ] They’ve also revealed that they
34
35

36
37

Matish, supra note 26 at 5.
Kim Zetter, ‘‘How the feds took down the Silk Road drug wonderland,” Wired (18
November 2013), online: <www.wired.com>: A multi-agency task force involving
investigators from the FBI, DEA, DHS, the IRS, US Postal Inspection, US Secret
Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives was eventually
formed, with simultaneous operations launched from Baltimore, New York and
Chicago [Zetter].
Ibid.
Ibid.
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found a logbook on his hard drive and a journal that allegedly detailed
his day-to-day activities running the site.38

Even though Ulbricht still maintains that the real Dread Pirates Robert has
framed him, it remains that law enforcement agencies were able to conduct a
successful operation on the dark web largely by exploiting human error as well as
using traditional methods.

(ii) Network vulnerabilities
The TOR traffic is, in theory, untraceable between the different nodes within
the circuit. However, it becomes visible exiting the Tor network through exit
nodes (e.g. when users browse the regular internet with the Tor software). 39 Since
volunteers around the world run these, research demonstrates that they are
susceptible of being used for snooping on users. Rumors in the industry affirm
that ‘‘70% or more of the TOR gateways are owned by intelligence services.”40
This affirmation is certainly fueled by the funding of TOR by public institutions
such as the Department of Homeland Security, but it is likely to be exaggerated.
However, few researches demonstrated how exit nodes may be corrupted for
surveillance purposes or to access personal information. In 2015, a security
researcher set up a fake website with a Bitcoin theme (a honeypot or honion) and
noted ‘‘over 600 unexplained page visits, 12 failed log-in attempts and 16
successful ones that hadn’t come from [the researcher].” 41 Precisely, out ‘‘of
about 1400 exit nodes, 16 attempted to seal the password and log in.”42 These
numbers are only indicative, keeping in mind that ‘‘the trap can only catch the
snoopers who are watching, interested in the bait and willing to act on it quickly”
thus, ‘‘[a]ny snoopers (or snooping software) that didn’t want to break cover for
a quick Bitcoin would have gone undetected.”43
In the same line of thought, another researcher was able to use the five Tor
exit nodes he set up to intercept ‘‘thousands of private emails, instant messages
38
39

40
41

42
43

Ibid.
Tor Project, supra note 28: ‘‘Tor will encrypt your traffic to and within the Tor network,
but the encryption of your traffic to the final destination website depends upon on that
website. To help ensure private encryption to websites, the Tor Browser includes HTTPS
Everywhere to force the use of HTTPS encryption with major websites that support it.
However, you should still watch the browser URL bar to ensure that websites you
provide sensitive information to display a blue or green URL bar button, include https://
in the URL, and display the proper expected name for the website.”
Supra note 27.
Mark Stockley, ‘‘Can you trust Tor’s exit nodes?,” Naked Security (25 June 2015), online:
<www.nakedsecurity.sophos.com> [Stockley].
Infante, supra note 32.
Stockley, supra note 42. This is even more dramatic that the researcher reported that
‘‘Tor’s semi-centralized system for purging bad nodes has totally failed to take action
against the bad nodes she did identify — they are still operating, and, presumably, still
snooping” (original research online: <www.chloe.re/2015/06/20/a-month-with-badonions>).
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and email account credentials” from victims that included international
embassies, the Indian Ministry of Defense and the Dalai Lama’s liaison office.
He concluded ‘‘that governments were funding expensive, high bandwidth exit
nodes for exactly that purpose.”44 Of course, what these researches also
demonstrate is that users misunderstand Tor and use it as an end-to-end
encryption tool, which it is clearly not.
Researcher Sambuddho Chakravarty of Columbia University was also able
to literally crack Tor and identify users with 81.5 per cent accuracy in real-world
tests. This is because the research community ‘‘knows no practical low-latency
design that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing
information on two sides.”45 This means that ‘‘if you visit a fake site that’s rigged
with, say, illegal drugs or child porn or something and download a relatively
large file from it (around 100 MB, he suggests), your identity can be discovered,
81 percent of the time.”46 In fact, another researcher discovered exit nodes
located in Russia that were ‘‘actively patching binaries users download, adding
malware to the files dynamically.”47
In 2016, other researchers also discovered hundreds of malicious hidden
service directories (HSDirs) which are used by users to access hidden websites:
When set up properly, these directories don’t record or log the
addresses of the services themselves, allowing the dark web sites to,
hopefully, remain undiscovered. But sometimes people deliberately
modify their HSDir to keep a record of all the sites it spots.48

By setting up honeypots in the Tor network, Guevara Noubir, a professor
from the College of Computer and Information Science at Northeastern
University, and Amirali Sanatinia, a PhD candidate also from Northeastern,
discovered an armada of Tor hidden service directories that are spying on dark
web sites. These modified nodes allow whoever is behind them — perhaps law
enforcement, hackers or other researchers — to find the addresses of sites that
are supposed to be secret.49
Most recently, researches by computer scientists at the MIT and the Qatar
Computer Research Institute demonstrated that by taking over a guard node,
they could identify with 88 per cent accuracy which websites users are
accessing.50
44
45

46

47

48

49

Ibid.
Sambuddho Chakravarty et al., ‘‘On the effectiveness of traffic analysis against
anonymity networks using flow records,” online: Columbia University .
Jason Koebler, ‘‘How the NSA (or anyone else) can crack Tor’s anonymity,”
Motherboard (19 November 2014), online: <www.motherboard.vice.com>.
See Dennis Fisher, ‘‘Researcher finds Tor exit node adding malware to binaries,” Threat
Post (24 October 2014), online: <www.threatpost.com>.
Joseph Cox, ‘‘Over 100 snooping Tor nodes have been spying on Dark Web sites,”
Motherboard (1 July 2016), online: <www.motherboard.vice.com>.
Ibid.
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Reporting these vulnerabilities in the Tor network has led to technical
improvements, but it has also prompted computer scientists to come up with an
alternative proposition. At the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium in
July, researchers at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne presented
‘Riffle’, a new anonymity scheme which combines current cryptographic
methods in a novel manner.51
Both human error and technical vulnerability in the dark web are windows
that may be exploited by law enforcement to conduct effective and successful
criminal investigations; yet, judges are often unaware that authorities may have a
choice. This is likely to prompt them to accept warrants which are broader than
necessary and endorse methods of investigation which are more intrusive than
required. The redaction of obscure applications for warrants does nothing but
contribute to a myth that prevents jurists to have an informed debate regarding
acceptable searches and seizures in the digital age.

II. IMPACTS OF THE DARK WEB ON PRIVACY AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
(a) Analysis of an emerging trend
In the United States, legal cases pertaining to both operations Marco Polo
and Pacifier have resulted in a legal trend granting no reasonable expectations of
privacy to users of Tor. This was explicit in Michaud, where Judge Bryan based
his opinion on an erroneous premise which presupposes that users had to share
their IP with strangers to connect with the network:
Under such a system, an individual would necessarily be disclosing his
identifying information to complete strangers. Again, according to the parties’
submissions, such a submission is made despite the understanding communicated
by the Tor Project that the Tor network has vulnerabilities and that users might
not remain anonymous. Under these circumstances Tor users clearly lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP addresses while using the Tor
network. In other words, they are taking a significant gamble on any real
expectation of privacy under these circumstances.52
50

51

52

See Mary-Ann Russon, ‘‘MIT cracks Tor anonymity network and identifies hidden
servers with 88% accuracy,” International Business Times (30 July 2015), online:
<www.ibtimes.co.uk>.
Larry Hardesty, ‘‘Network can protect users’ anonymity if all but one of its servers are
compromised,” MIT News (11 July 2016), online: . ‘‘The heart of the system is a series of
servers called a mixnet. Each server permutes the order in which it receives messages
before passing them on to the next. [. . .] Like many anonymity systems, Riffle also uses a
technique known as onion encryption. [. . .] To thwart message tampering, Riffle uses a
technique called a verifiable shuffle [. . .] the encryption can be done in such a way that the
server can generate a mathematical proof that the messages it sends are valid
manipulations of the ones it receives.”
Farrell, supra note 16.
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In Judge Bryan’s view, IP addresses fall under the third party doctrine
according to which there is no expectation of privacy when an information is
transmitted to a third party, even unwittingly.53 This view was the one advanced
by the American Department of Justice in his counter-argument recently
unsealed. Both the judge and prosecutors ‘‘suggest that Michaud voluntarily
gave up his true IP address even while using Tor, because his IP could have been
correlated with his anonymized connection to the hidden site by ‘other means’,
which they don’t specify.”54
Recent cases have also exposed some of the methods which the law
authorities have used in order to investigate in the dark web. As previously
discussed, these include traditional ones such as infiltration, but also lesstraditional one, such as mass-hacking through drive-by downloads, man-in-themiddle attacks or by corrupting nodes. Many accused have subsequently argued
that they are unable to fairly defend themselves in trial without access to the
complete source code of the NIT for an expertise of how the software affects
computers’ security settings.55
Other debatable methods have included a subpoena to computer scientists
funded by the federal government to research the dark web at Carnegie Mellon
University. The subpoena forced the team to hand over the IP addresses it
obtained through their academic work.56 This permitted the authorities to access
at least 78 IP addresses, including the one of Brian Richard Farrell, Silk Road 2’s
administrator. Commentators argued that this was not only unethical, but also
contrary to the Fourth Amendment because it constituted a way to bypass the
requirement to obtain a warrant in order to breach users’ privacy.57

(b) Canadian jurisprudence and the future of privacy in the dark web
There are major legal differences between American and Canadian
jurisdictions. It is useful to note that in the United States, once an e-mail or a
message has been received, it is no longer protected through privacy concerns. 58
53

54

55

56
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See Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735; 99 S Ct 2577 (1979). The judge found that telephone
users do not have an interest in the phone numbers that they dial, as the phone company
has access to them.
Joshua Kopstein, ‘‘Justice Department to Judge: Tor users have no expectations of
privacy,” Motherboard (6 February 2016), online: <www.motherboard.vice.com>
[Kopstein].
See United States v Werdene, No. 2:15-cr-00434, ECF No 33 (E.D. Pa. 18 May 2016);
United States v Levin, No. 15-10271, 2016 WL 2596010 (D. Mass May 5, 2016); United
States v Arterbury, No. 15-cr-182, ECF No. 47 (N.D. Okla., 25 Apr. 2016); United States
v Epich, No. 15-cr-163, 2016 WL 953269 (E.D. Wis., 14 Mar. 2016); United States v
Stamper, No. 1:15-cr-109, ECF No. 48 (S.D. Ohio, 19 Feb. 2016); Michaud, supra note
18.
Joseph Cox, ‘‘Confirmed: Carnegie Mellon University attacked Tor, was subpoenaed by
Feds,” Motherboard (24 February 2016), online: <www.motherboard.vice.com>.
Tor, ‘‘Did the FBI Pay a University to Attack Tor Users?c (11 November 2015), online:
Tor (blog) <blog.torproject.org/blog/did-fbi-pay-university-attack-tor-users>.
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This is not true in Canada, where British Columbia’s Court of Appeal has
established that a sender has reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the
fact that his message will be received in confidentiality. 59 This is definitely a
factor which may influence the development of a Canadian legal perspective on
the dark web.
R v Spencer, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, has also
paved the way for a broader understanding of privacy which may also protect
users in the dark web while addressing some of the main critics of Michaud,
among which a neglect of users’ intentions while using a software specifically
designed for anonymity:
But this ignores the fact that people use Tor specifically because they
don’t want to use the internet ‘‘normally,” they want to use the internet
anonymously. It’s true that, like with any website or service, you expose
your real IP address to an ISP when connecting to the Tor network. But
that network is purposefully designed to bounce data around the globe
so that you don’t reveal your IP to the site you’re connecting to.60

Spencer revolves around the police’s decision to make a written ‘‘law
enforcement request‘‘ to Shaw demanding the name, address and phone numbers
of the customer using an IP address that was involved in the sharing of child
pornography. They further used this information to obtain a warrant and search
the accused’s phone. The defense contended that the police obtaining the
subscriber information matching the IP address constituted a search and should
have been authorized by a warrant. To answer this question, the court first had
to determine whether the accused had an expectation of privacy regarding the
information provided by the internet provider to the police.
This is determined by taking into consideration ‘‘the totality of the
circumstances,” including ‘‘interrelated factors.”61 For the purpose of the dark
web, it is interesting to note how the court underlines that the accused’s
‘‘subjective expectation of privacy in his online activities can readily be inferred
from his use of the network connection to transmit sensitive information: Cole, at
58

59
60
61

See United States v Lifshitz, 369 F. 3d 137 (2d Cir. 2004) with some exceptions when the
legal duty of confidentiality is involved, see e.g. United States v Knoll, 16 F. 3d 1313 at
1321 (2d Cir. 1994).
R v Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370, 2015 CarswellBC 2386, 327 C.C.C. (3d) 151.
Kopstein, supra note 55.
Spencer, supra note 10 at para 17. These factors were described at the following
paragraph: ‘‘[18] The wide variety and number of factors that may be considered in
assessing the reasonable expectation of privacy ‘‘can be grouped under four main
headings for analytical convenience: (1) the subject matter of the alleged search; (2) the
claimant’s interest in the subject matter; (3) the claimant’s subjective expectation of
privacy in the subject matter; and (4) whether this subjective expectation of privacy was
objectively reasonable, having regard to the totality of the circumstances: Tessling, at
para. 32; R v Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 SCR 579, at para. 27; R v Cole, 2012 SCC 53,
[2012] 3 SCR 34, at para. 40.”
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para 43.”62 Most importantly, ruled to broaden the traditional view of
informational privacy as ‘‘confidentiality and control of the use of intimate
information about oneself” to a view that ‘‘account[s] for the role that anonymity
plays in protecting privacy interests online”:63
[38] To return to informational privacy, it seems to me that privacy in
relation to information includes at least three conceptually distinct
although overlapping understandings of what privacy is. These are
privacy as secrecy, privacy as control and privacy as anonymity.
[. . .]
[41] [. . .] In my view, the concept of privacy potentially protected by s. 8
must include this understanding of privacy.64

R v Spencer is the first recognition of anonymity as a protected right by the
Supreme Court of Canada, which further states its importance in the precise
context of internet which ‘‘increased both the quality and quantity of
information that is stored.”65 The court finally stresses that ‘‘the identity of a
person linked to their use of the Internet must be recognized as giving rise to a
privacy interest beyond that inherent in the person’s name, address and
telephone number found in the subscriber information”66 and finally concludes
that ‘‘there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber
information.”67 The significance of this case is that Canadian law enforcement
must obtain warrants to connect IP addresses with personal information, while it
is currently not the case in the United States.
Building from R v Spencer, Canadian judges are likely to avoid many of the
pitfalls characterizing American legal precedents. The judicial community also
has a great starting point to engage in an informed debate about the methods of
investigation that they judge acceptable and the expectation of privacy users
should expect with anonymity tool. The risks of overly broad and obscure
warrants pertaining to questionable methods of investigation should not be
discarded too easily, and the necessity to guarantee a fair trial to accused should
motivate a reflection on how privacy and security can be balanced in a manner
which reflects the realities of the dark web rather than common myths.
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Ibid at para 19.
Ibid at para 34.
Ibid at paras 38, 41.
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